



VALUE OF SHORT-RUN DEMAND RESPONSE FOR INTEGRATING WIND: UNIT COMMITMENT & GENERATION EXPANSION MODELING WITH PRICE RESPONSIVE LOAD

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
Professor, Energy Institute/Electa Branch, KU Leuven

Thanks to Electricity Policy Research Group of Cambridge University and NSF



Overview

- **Problem:** Lack of demand response in operations & planning models
- Representing price responsive consumers
- **Operations:** Unit commitment
 - Effect of DR on dispatch
 - Effect of wind ‘must take’ requirements
 - » Neither economically nor environmentally desirable
- **Investment:** Capacity expansion
 - Effect of DR on optimal wind investment
 - Effect of X-price elasticity



What is the problem?

Unit commitment & generation investment models assume **fixed short-run loads**

They neglect opportunities for:

- improved dispatch & investment
- renewables integration



What do we need?

Models accounting for price responsive consumers

We quantify:

- changes in decisions
- efficiency benefits



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




Representing behavior of price responsive consumers

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Constructing an elastic short-term demand curve:

1. Solve cost minimizing model, given initial demand levels DEM_0
2. Obtain weighted average electricity price P_0
3. Add own-price elasticity to (P_0, DEM_0)
 - Direct response
4. Add X-price elasticity
 - Load shifting





Demand functions in optimization models

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
If we have symmetry in X-effects:

Welfare maximization model

Objective: MAX welfare

= **consumer** + **producer** surplus
= demand curve integral - cost

Subject to: system power balance
operational constraints
(installed reserve margin)



Three computational methods tested

1. Quadratic program (Samuelson, 1952)
 - Symmetry required of X-elasticity effects
2. Complementarity (Cottle, Pang, Stone, 1992)
 - Doesn't require symmetry
 - Cannot readily handle binary variables
3. PIES iterative piecewise linearization (Hogan, 1975)
 - Can handle asymmetry & binary variables

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
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Unit commitment model for wind dominated system

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Min Cost = Cost of fuel + emissions + startups + wind curtailment

Or Max Welfare = Demand curve integral – Cost (own elasticity only)

s.t. System power balance

Ramping constraints

Capacity restrictions

Minimum run levels

Start-up


Minimum on- and down-time

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Unit commitment results: Uniform price, fixed demand

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


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Unit commitment results: Demand response (own elasticity = -0.2)

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Net effect of demand response @ $\epsilon=-0.2$


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$\Delta\text{Cost} = -14\%$ (more if forecasts uncertain)

$\Delta\text{Welfare} = +1.4\%$ (as fraction of cost)

$\Delta\text{Wind spill} = -100\%$

$\Delta\text{CO}_2 = -7\%$



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Giving wind absolute priority makes neither economic nor environmental sense

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- EU 'must take' rules; -\$150 bids (or lower) likely in US CAISO
 - Can increase both costs and emissions
- Minimizing wind spill increases fuel costs & CO₂ (relative to dispatch under 0€/MWh wind bid)
 - 17% reduction in spill possible
 - Per MWh of spill reduction:
 - 0.71 ton CO₂ increase (+1.5% total CO₂)
 - 49 € cost increase (+1.3% total cost)
- Assumes:
 - No demand elasticity
 - Fuel dominates startup costs



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
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Generation capacity expansion

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- Key tradeoffs:
 - More wind penetration requires more ramp capability
 - Baseload capacity less rampable
 - Demand response could provide
- Gen expansion models: often lack ramp and demand-response
 - Need these features to optimally integrate renewables
 - Effect of adding ramp limits upon optimal mix:





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P & Q effects of own- and X-price elasticities

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- Valley fill & peak reduction effects
- X-price elasticities yield:
 - less load response
 - more price volatility





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Demand response in investment planning

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Example
Dispatch
& Investment
Mix



Effect of elasticity on gen mix

- Less cycling capacity
- More wind


Welfare improvements:

- +1%/3% for $\epsilon = -0.1/-0.25$
- Expressed as % of supply cost



Effect of X-elasticity upon investment mix

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Conclusion

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- Models should account for responsive consumers
 - Ideally: both own- and X-elasticities
 - Welfare max or equilibrium calculation rather than cost minimization
- Short-term response yields
 - Reduced gen investment + operation costs
 - Enhanced value for variable wind power
- Future work:
 - Account for both long- and short-run elasticity
 - Account for uncertain forecasts, lags between commitments and outcomes



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